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In a recent Letter [F.C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104 (2005)], the
scale-free networks are found to be advantageous for the emergence of cooperation. In the present
work an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with players located on Baraba´si-Albert scale-free
networks is studied in detail. The players are pure strategist and can follow two strategies: either
to defect or to cooperate. Serval alternative update rules determining the evolution of each player’s
strategy are considered. Using systematic Monte Carlo simulations we have calculated the average
density of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect. It is shown that the results
obtained by numerical experiments depend strongly on the dynamics of the game, which could
lower the important of scale-free topology on the persistence of the cooperation. Particularly, the
system exhibits a phase transition, from active state (coexistence of cooperators and defectors)
to absorbing state (only defectors surviving) when allowing “worse”strategy to be imitated in the
evolution of the game.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
Cooperation is widespread in many biological, social
and economic systems [1]. Understanding the emergence
and persistence of cooperation in these system is one of
the fundamental and central problems [1, 2]. In investi-
gating this problem the most popular framework utilized
is game theory together with its extensions to an evo-
lutionary context [3]. One simple game, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (PDG), has attracted most attention in
theoretical and experimental studies [4]. In the stan-
dard PDG, the players can either defect or cooperate;
two interacting players are offered a certain payoff, the
reward R, for mutual cooperation and a lower payoff, the
punishment P , for mutual defection. If one player coop-
erates while the other defects, then the cooperator gets
the lowest sucker’s payoff S, while the defector gains the
highest payoff, the temptation to defect T . Thus, we ob-
tain T > R > P > S. It is easy to see that defection is
the better choice irrespective of the opponent’s selection.
For this reason, defection is the only evolutionary stable
strategy in fully mixed populations [3].
Since the cooperation is abundant and robust in na-
ture, considerable efforts have been expended trying to
understanding the evolution of cooperation on the basis
of the PDG [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. These extensions
include those in which the players are assumed to have
memory of the previous interactions [5], or players are
spatially distributed [6], or allowing the players to vol-
untary participating [7]. In addition, dynamic network
model [9] and dynamic payoff matrices [10] were also in-
troduced to sustain high concentration of cooperation in
PDG. In a recent Letter [8], Santos and Pacheco have
studied the PDG and another famous game, the snow-
drift game (commonly known as the hawk-dove or chicken
game), on scale-free networks and observed interesting
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evolutionary results: due to the underlying network gen-
erated by growth and preferential attachment (or the
scale-free topology), the cooperation can be greatly en-
hanced and becomes the dominating trait throughout the
entire range of parameters of both games [8].
In the present work, we study the PDG on Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) scale-free networks [11, 12]. Serval alter-
native update rules determining the evolution of each
player’s strategy are considered in the following. Using
systematic Monte Carlo (MC) simulations we have cal-
culated the average density of cooperators as a function
of the temptation to defect. It is shown that the results
obtained by numerical experiments depend strongly on
the dynamics of the game, whichs suggest that the scale-
topology of the underlying interacting network may not
be the crucial factor persisting the high density of the
cooperators. Of particular interesting, we have found
that the system undergoes a phase transition, from ac-
tive state (coexistence of cooperators and defectors) to
absorbing state (only defectors surviving) when allow-
ing “worse ”strategy (adopted by the player who gains a
lower payoff) to be imitated in the evolution of the game.
The model and simulation. We consider the PDG with
pure strategist: the players can follow two strategies, ei-
ther to defect or to cooperate (C). Each player interacts
with its neighbors and collects payoff depended on the
payoff parameters. The total payoff of a certain player is
the sum over all interactions. Following common studies
[6, 8, 13, 14, 15], we also start by rescaling the game such
that it depends on a single parameter, i.e., we can choose
R = 1, P = S = 0, and T = b (1.0 ≤ b ≤ 2.0) repre-
senting the advantage of defectors over cooperators (or
the temptation to defect), without any loss of generality
of the game. After each round, the players are allowed
to inspect their neighbors’ payoffs and, according to the
comparison, determine their strategies to be adopted in
the next round. To investigate how the dynamics of the
game affect the evolution of the cooperation, three kinds
2of update rules which determine the transformation of
each player’s strategy are considered in the following.
I) Best-takes-over. It is commonly observed that peo-
ple try to imitate a strategy of their most successful
neighbor [10]. Thus we first use a deterministic rule ac-
cording to which the individual with the highest gain in a
given neighborhood reproduces with certainty. Since the
PDG performed on scale-free networks whose elements
(or nodes) possess heterogeneous connectivity [12]. To
avoid an additional bias from the higher degree of some
nodes, the gain of the certain player is calculated as the
average payoff of the individual interactions: the sum of
the payoff from each neighbor is divided by the number
of the neighbors. It is important to note that this rule
does not reduce to the replicator dynamics when applied
to individual-based models of populations without spa-
tial structure [16]. This update rule has also been widely
adopted in the studying of PDG [9, 10, 13, 14].
II) Betters-possess-chance. Technically, the rule I is
particularly simple to implement, but its biological rel-
evance is rather limited because it assumes a noise free
environment. Thus in the second case the stochasticity
is add to the dynamics, and we adopt the update method
just as the one used in Ref. [17] (the unique place dif-
ferent from Ref. [8] is to consider average payoff of the
players rather than the total payoff), i.e., evolution is
carried out implementing the finite population analogue
of replicator dynamics [4, 17] by means of the following
transition probabilities: in each generation, whenever a
site i is updated, a neighbor j is drawn at random among
all its neighbors; whenever Ej > Ei (i.e., only the better
players have the chance to reproduce, and if Ei > Ej the
player does not change its strategy), the chosen neighbor
takes over site i with probability given by
W =
Ej − Ei
T − S
, (1)
where Ei and Ej correspond to the average payoffs ac-
cumulated by the player i and j in the previous round
respectively.
III) Payoff-difference-dependent. One can see that, for
both the above rules, the error mutation, which is very
common in evolutionary systems, is not permitted, i.e.,
the players who gain lower average payoffs have no chance
to replace a neighbor who does better than them. The
update rule dependent on the payoff difference, which was
adopted widely in literature [7, 15, 17, 18] can overcome
this difficult. Given the average payoffs (Ei and Ej) from
the previous round, the player i adopts the neighbor j’s
strategy with probability
W =
1
1 + exp [−(Ej − Ei)/κ]
, (2)
where κ characterizes the noise introduced to permit irra-
tional choices. This update rule states that the strategy
of a better performing player is readily adopted, whereas
it is unlikely, but not impossible, to adopt the strategies
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FIG. 1: Average density of cooperators as a function of the
temptation to defect b in a evolutionary PDG on BA scale-free
networks driven by the update rule I (best-takes-over).
of worse performing payers. The parameter κ incorpo-
rates the uncertainties in the strategy adoption. In the
limit of large κ values, all information is lost, that is,
player i is unable to retrieve any information from Ej
and switches to the strategy of j by tossing a coin [17].
Generate a random number r uniformly distributed be-
tween zero and one, if r < W , the neighbor’s strategy is
imitated.
Initially, the two strategies was randomly distributed
among the players with equal probability 1/2. The above
rules of the model are iterated with parallel updating by
varying the value of b. The total sampling times are
11000 MC steps and all the results shown below are av-
erages over the last 1000 steps.
Results and discussion. In the following we show the
results of simulations performed in a system of N =
10000 players located on BA scale-free networks with av-
erage connectivity of the nodes fixed as 4 (the construc-
tion of BA network can refer to Refs. [11, 12]). Our key
quantity is the average density of players adopting the
strategy C in the steady-state. First let us consider the
model driven by the rule I. The simulation results are
shown in Fig. 1. The cooperators and defectors coexist
and coevolution throughout the entire range of parame-
ter b. With the increasing of the temptation to defect,
the average density of cooperators decreases monotoni-
cally; the cooperation is inhibited quickly and sustains
a low level in a wide range of the parameter, which is
clearly different from the results obtained in Ref. [8] us-
ing different dynamics where the cooperators dominate
the whole range of parameter of the game.
The evolutionary results of the game under the update
rule II are reported in Fig. 2. As compared to the for-
mer case, cooperators can exist and survive in the whole
region of b. However, the cooperation in the region of
large values of b, namely b > 1.4, is extremely inhibited
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FIG. 2: As shown in Fig. 1, but for the system driven by the
update rule II (betters-possess-chance). For the sake of com-
parison, the evolutionary results adopting the original method
of Ref. [8] are also given out using squares.
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FIG. 3: As shown in Fig. 1, but for the system driven by
the update rule III (payoff-difference-dependent). Squares,
circles and triangles correspond to different noise intensity
κ = 0.04, 0.03, 0.02 respectively. The lines are guides to the
eye.
when allowing more “better ”players’ strategies to be im-
itated in strategy updating of the players. The density
of cooperators maintains a minor level and is almost in-
visible in Figure 2 (yet larger than zero). To compare
distinctly with the results presented in Ref. [8], we also
calculated the average density of C by taking account
into total payoff difference, just as what has been done
in Ref. [8], instead of average payoff difference in the
update rule II. As expected, we recover qualitatively the
results of Ref. [8]: cooperation becomes the dominat-
ing trait throughout the entire range of parameter of the
game. The minor difference comes from the average times
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FIG. 4: Average density of cooperators as a function of the
temptation to defect b in a evolutionary PDG on a random
regular graph with total nodes N = 10000. The number of
neighbors is fixed as 4 for each node. From top to bottom,
(a), (b) and (c) correspond to the evolutionary results of the
game driven by the update rule I, II and III respectively. The
data in (c) are obtained for κ = 0.03.
of the results. Due to the computational resource limit,
here the experiment results are averaged over 20 simula-
tions for the same network of contacts (less than the 100
simulations in Ref. [8]). The difference between the two
results is distinct: the cooperation is no longer dominat-
ing whenever the average payoff difference is considered
in rule II.
Now let us consider the case of payoff-difference-
dependent. Figure 3 shows the b dependence of the av-
erage density of cooperators for different intensity of the
noise κ = 0.02, 0.03, 0.04. Once again, the cooperation is
not the favorable choice of the players in a wide range of
b. Of particular interesting, one can observe that there
arises two separate phases (coexistence phase and absorb-
ing phase) of the evolution. As indicated, the average
density of C decreases monotonically with increasing b
until a certain threshold value bc where the cooperators
vanish and an absorbing state (all defectors) forming.
The threshold value depends on the level of the noise:
the smaller intensity of the noise κ, the larger threshold
bc. These phenomena are reminiscent of the studies in
Ref. [15], where the players are located on a two dimen-
4sional square lattice with periodic boundary and interact
with their four nearest neighbors.
From the above simulations, one can see that the dy-
namics (or at least the combination of the structure of the
network and the dynamics), rather than only the scale-
free topology, has an deterministic influence on the evo-
lution of the PDG. In order to check this statement, we
also investigated the case that all players are located on
a random regular graph [19]. These two network mod-
els hold similar geometric characters: small average path
length and small clustering coefficient, whereas expect
for the connectivity distribution of the vertices (one be-
haves scale-free and the other displays peak distribution)
[12]. In this way, we expect that the experimental results
may give out some intrinsic view: whether the scale-free
topology is crucial for the emergence of high density of
cooperators? The simulation results obtained for ran-
dom regular graph are plotted in Fig. 4. The qualitative
behavior of the data are consistent, on the whole, with
those that the PDG is played on BA scale-free networks.
For best-takes-over rule, the lack of stochasticity magni-
fies the importance of certain local configurations, which
results in discontinuous jumps and plateaus of the steady
state density of cooperators as a function of the tempta-
tion to defect b (Fig.4(a)), different from the continuous
decay on BA scale-free networks (Fig. 1). In spite of this
quantitative discrepancy, however, the qualitative trend
is similar, i.e., high concentration of cooperators for weak
temptation to defect and minor level for the strong case.
Whenever all better players are allowed to share a chance
to reproduce, the cooperation is inhibited in the same
way with the increasing of temptation and the average
density of C maintain a very low level for large b val-
ues (larger than zero though invisible in Fig.4(b)); and if
bad imitation is permitted (the rule III), absorbing phase
arising when a certain value of bc arrived (Fig.4(c)).
Conclusions. To sum up, we have explored the general
question of cooperation formation and sustainment on
BA scale-free networks based on the framework of PDG
with different driving dynamics. The simulation results
suggest that the topology of the underlying interacting
network, i.e., the scale-free structure, may not be the cru-
cial factor for the emergence and the persistence of the
cooperation, whose evolutionary results depend strongly
on the dynamics governing the game. These results are
different from those obtained in a recent work Ref. [8]
whose researches support that the scale-free networks are
advantageous for the emergence of cooperation. Of par-
ticular interesting, we have found that the system under-
goes a phase transition, from active state to absorbing
state when allowing “worse ”strategy to be imitated in
the evolution of the game. Comparisons between the
evolution implemented on BA scale-free networks and on
random regular graph also gave out the same hints: there
is no obvious evidence supporting the scale-free topology
possessing particular advantage for the emergence of co-
operation.
A lots of things are waited to do further. Here we only
considered the case of PDG. Are the results obtained in
the present work also suitable for the case of the snow-
drift game when considering different dynamics? how the
fraction of cooperators goes to zero when taking account
into the payoff-difference-dependent rule? What is the
accurate diagrams between bc and κ? What is the rela-
tionship between the extinction behavior of cooperators
and the case studied by Szabo´ and To˝ke [15] (there they
found that the extinction behavior of the cooperators on
square lattice when increasing b belongs to universality
class of directed percolation)? Work along these lines is
in progress.
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